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A large number of microeconomic decision variables such as investments, prices,
inventories or employment are characterized by intermittent large adjustments.
The behavior of those variables has been often modeled as following state-dependent
rules. The optimality of such state-dependent rules depends crucially on the con-
tinuous observation of the relevant state, an assumption which is far from being
fulﬁlled in practice. We propose an alternative model, where at least part of
information about the relevant state variable is infrequent. We study several al-
ternatives. We start with the special case where innovations are infrequent, but
are readily observed. Only in this case are optimal rules state-dependent. We
then explore the common case of infrequent and delayed information. It may
arrive at deterministic times, like periodic macroeconomic statistics, or stochasti-
cally, when some events trigger announcements. Part of the relevant information
may be continuously observed, while the other part is only observed infrequently.
The resulting rules are time and state dependent, characterized by trigger and
target points that are functions of the time spent since the last time of informa-
tion arrival. We derive the conditions which characterize the optimal rules and
provide numerical algorithms for each case.1. Introduction
In the last decade, the macroeconomic literature paid considerable attention to
the potential aggregate eﬀects of intermittent large adjustments in microeconomic
decision variables1 such as investments, prices, inventories or employment.2 Mi-
croeconomic decision rules were modeled as state-dependent rules, where it was
assumed that the relevant state variable is continuously and perfectly observed.
These rules were justiﬁed by the existence of kinked adjustment costs (Harrison,
Selke and Taylor, Bertola and Caballero, 1990). For example, in pricing models
economic agents observe continuously and at no cost the frictionless optimal level
of prices and reevaluate constantly at which level they should set their price if
they were to change it. Since adjusting their price entails a cost, they weigh this
cost against the expected beneﬁts from the change and end up adjusting their
price infrequently. As pointed out by Woodford (2002), the assumptions underly-
ing these models are not particularly realistic. Faced by the costs associated with
information collection or decision-making, ﬁrms often reconsider pricing policy at
a particular time of year. In this paper we reexamine individual optimal rules in
realistic situations where information is infrequent but where deciding to change
economic variables still involves adjustment costs. Information may arrive peri-
odically or when some events occur. We analyze several variations which capture
diﬀerent economic settings and derive for each the optimal decision rule.
Examples of such exogenous intermittent ﬂows of information are pervasive:
macroeconomic statistics such as inﬂation, level of employment or GNP are pub-
1We are referring to models of state-dependent rules. In fact, ten years before the start of
this literature, time-dependent pricing rules became an essencial ingredient for the Keynesian
reaction to the rational expectations revolution. However, the only microeconomic decision
variable of interest was price. Examples of macroeconomic models built on time-dependent
pricing rules are Fischer (1977), Taylor (1979), and more recently, Ball (1994), Ireland (1997),
and Bonomo and Carvalho (1999).
2For prices, see Caplin and Spulber (1987), Caplin and Leahy (1991), Caballero and Engel
(1992 and 1993), Tsiddon (1993) and Almeida and Bonomo (2002); for investment, Caballero
and Engel (1999); for inventories, Caplin (1985); for consumption of durables, Caballero (1993)
and for employment, Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1994).
1lished periodically, dividends of ﬁrms are announced only at certain dates, infor-
mation arrives in asset markets after regular closings on weekdays and holidays.
In all these cases, agents do not observe continuously the variable of interest.
We start by introducing infrequent information in its simplest analytical set-
ting. If we assume that the new information is generated infrequently, but is
readily observed, the optimal rule is still state-dependent, characterized by an
inaction region which is time invariant. This is similar to Ss rules used in the
literature. The type of decision rule is modiﬁed when innovation is generated
continuously but it is observed infrequently. Then, it is reasonable to assume that
the amount of new information revealed to the decision maker is positively related
w i t ht h et i m ee l a p s e ds i n c es h ew a sl a s ti n f o r m e d .F r o mh e r eo nw ew i l lr e f e rt o
this type of information release as delayed.
We ﬁrst assume that this delayed information arrives at random rates, to
compare more directly with the infrequent but immediate release case. Then the
inaction region for the relevant state variable depends on the time elapsed since
the last observation. Thus, the optimal rule is both time and state dependent.
We then proceed by assuming that the delayed information arrives at determin-
istic times. Then, the inaction range is radically enlarged at instants before the
revelation of information, implying that in these instances it is always optimal to
wait3.
A feature of optimal rules with delayed information is the possibility of unin-
formed adjustments, based only on the long run trend of the frictionless process
for the control variable. This possibility happens if the trend is large enough
3In Bonomo and Garcia (2001), we also determine the optimal policy in the presence of
both lump-sum adjustment costs and infrequent information about the value of the frictionless
optimal level of the control variable but we assume that the stochastic process of the frictionless
optimal value of the control variable has no drift, simplifying the problem considerably. We
found that the optimal rule is for agents to adjust or not depending on the state at times of
information arrivals. It is characterized by a single parameter s, which determined the inaction
range (−s,s) for the discrepancy between the frictionless optimal value of the control variable
and its actual value, at times of information arrival. This simplicity allowed us to proceed
further, by aggregating the optimal rules and deriving macroeconomic implications.
2compared to the average period between information arrivals. Then, we can ra-
tionalize pricing rules with preset adjustments between optimal adjustments, used
in the macro literature (see Fischer , Yun, 1996, and Woodford, 1999). This type
of rule seems realistic if inﬂation is suﬃciently high, which is an implication of
our model. Conversely, according to our model, there will be no uninformed ad-
justment if the trend is small, which seems consistent with the evidence of pricing
rules for low inﬂation economies (see Blinder et al., 1998, for US evidence).
N e x tw ea n a l y z ea ni n t e r m e d i a t eb u tm o r er e a l i s t i cs i t u a t i o nw h e r ep a r to ft h e
information arrives continuously and freely to the agent, while another part arrives
infrequently. We also assume in this case that the infrequent arrival of information
is deterministic. In this situation, some adjustments may occur given the partial
information acquired continuously, over and above the adjustments which take
place given the whole information. If the free information is the price level, this
rule will lead to adjustment by the inﬂation rate in between optimal adjustments.
This indexation rule is a realistic representation of price and wage setting rules
f o l l o w e di nh i g hi n ﬂation countries, as it happened in Brazil, Israel and Chile. It
was also used in the literature to analyze the consequences of indexation for the
cost of disinﬂation (see Bonomo and Garcia , 1994 for price setting, and Jadresic,
2002, for wage setting applications).
All the above problems can be characterized by dynamic programming with
two conveniently chosen state variables: the elapsed time since the last information
arrival, and the conditional expectation of the discrepancy between the friction-
less optimal value and the actual value of the control variable, given the current
information of the agent. Finding an optimal rule in the case of infrequent and
free information consists in ﬁnding trigger upper and lower barriers {l(τ),u(τ)}
a n da no p t i m a lt a r g e tp o i n tc(τ) for this expected discrepancy, as a function of
the time elapsed since the last information arrival. The Bellman equation which
characterizes our value function in case of no adjustment or information collec-
tion is rewritten as a partial diﬀerential equation in time and space. Boundary
conditions which depend on the various cases regarding the arrival of information
3and the presence of adjustment or information costs are imposed. The solution,
which depends on both the diﬀerential equation and the boundary conditions, is
solved numerically using various algorithms based on ﬁnite diﬀerence methods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop a basic
framework for analyzing decisions under infrequent information and adjustment
cost, which will be used throughout the models. In section 3 we present models
with immediate information where the optimal rules are state-dependent. In sec-
tion 4 we derive optimal rules in models of infrequent delayed information and
adjustment costs. The last section concludes.
2. The basic problem under infrequent information
We start by setting up the problem in a context where the agent does not have
access continuously to new information. As in the standard case, we assume that
the agent controls a variable xt and that the frictionless optimal value of this
control variable, denoted x∗
t, follows a Markovian stochastic process.
When the control variable drifts away from its optimal level, the agent incurs an
instantaneous ﬂow cost which, for simplicity, is assumed to be equal to l(xt−x∗
t)2dt,
where l is an arbitrary constant. To reduce the discrepancy between the control
variable and its optimal level, the agent has to pay a lump-sum adjustment cost
k. Time is discounted at a constant instantaneous rate ρ.
Suppose now that the agent does not have access continuously to the informa-
tion about x∗. Then, she must form a probabilistic assessment of its value at time
t, x∗
t, from the time of the last information arrival, say s, in order to evaluate the
expected ﬂow cost of deviating from the frictionless optimal value, Es(xt − x∗
t)2.













The ﬁrst term in the right-hand side represents the known cost of deviating
from the expected optimal level as the second represents the expected cost of not
4observing the optimal level continuously. Let us examine the ﬁrst term. If there
were no adjustment costs, xt will be set equal to Esx∗
t, reducing the ﬁr s tp a r to f
the deviation cost to zero. In the presence of an adjustment cost, the agent must
optimally solve the trade-oﬀ between letting xt drift away from its expectation
and paying the cost to adjust. As for the second term we know that it is zero when
information is always available and is free. If information is costly, but there is
no adjustment cost, the agent can reduce the second term by paying information
costs. The optimal policy will therefore account for the trade-oﬀ between letting
the second term increase and paying more information costs. If information is
exogenously infrequent, the agent cannot reduce immediately the second term
but, as we will see, the adjustment decision will be inﬂuenced by it.
From the structure of the problem and from the assumption that the stochastic
process for x∗ is Markovian, it is clear that the value function at any time is
determined by two state variables: the known deviation of xt from its expected
frictionless optimal level deﬁned as
yt = xt − Esx
∗
t (2.2)
and the time elapsed since the last information arrival4
τ = t − s. (2.3)
We can therefore express Es(xt −x∗




t + Va r s(x
∗
s+τ) (2.4)
where Va r s(.) denotes the variance conditional on the information at time s.
4To have a discrepancy xs − x∗
s at the time of information arrival s gives a value function
starting at t that is identical to the value function starting at time v when information arrived
at time v−(t−s) and the discrepancy xv−(t−s)−x∗
v−(t−s) = xs−x∗
s. Therefore, the discrepancy
x − x∗ is a suﬃcient state variable for the value function at times of information arrival.
5With lump-sum adjustment costs, resetting of the control variable will be
infrequent. Between two adjustments, the value function - the minimized value of
the program of the agent - should obey the following Bellman equation:
V (yt,τ)=f(yt,τ)dt + e
−ρdtV (yt+dt,τ+ dt) (2.5)
This Bellman equation will be valid for all cases analyzed in this paper, includ-
ing the full information case. The cases will vary according to the assumptions
made about the stochastic process of x∗
t (and therefore yt) and the boundary
conditions imposed.
3. Optimal rules with immediate information
We will present ﬁrst the known case of continuous full information, which will serve
as a benchmark. We will then introduce infrequent information in its simplest
setting: the innovation in the frictionless stochastic process x∗ follows a Poisson
process with a ﬁxed variance. In this particular setting of infrequent information
there is no delay in the arrival of information. As a consequence, optimal control
rules are still state-dependent. Indeed, at any time, only the known discrepancy
between the optimal and the actual value of the control variable matters.
When information is immediate the setup is a particular case of our general
framework of the last section where s is always equal to t. Hence, Esx∗
t = x∗
t and
τ will always be equal to zero. Thus, there is only one state variable yt,w h i c h
becomes:
yt = xt − x
∗
t










This is a well-known case, and we report it for comparison purposes (see Dixit,
1993). We assume, for simplicity, that x∗
t follows a Brownian motion:
dx
∗
t = µdt + σdWt (3.2)
where W is a Wiener process.
Observe that, when no control is exerted yt follows the process
dyt = −µdt + σdWt
Applying Ito’s lemma we can rewrite the Bellman equation.(3.1) as the follow-






0(y)µ − ρV (y)+y
2 =0 (3.3)
























The optimal rule is characterized by (l,c,u), where l and u are respectively
the lower and upper barriers which trigger control and c is the optimal target
point. Therefore, the value function should satisfy several conditions. First, an
optimality condition:
Vy (c)=0 (3.7)
7Then, two value matching conditions between l and c and between u and c,
which express that the diﬀerences in the value function at the barriers and at the
optimal target point should be equal to the adjustment cost:
V (l)=V (c)+k, (3.8)
V (u)=V (c)+k (3.9)
Thus, we must also have:
Vy(l)=0 (3.10)
Vy(u)=0 (3.11)
The conditions (3.7), (3.10) and (3.11), known as smooth pasting conditions,
and the value matching conditions (3.8) and (3.9) imposed on the value function
expression 3.4 allow us to determine the constants A, B and the policy parameters
l, u and c. Figure 1 illustrates a trajectory of the state variable yt with the
following values of the parameters: µ =0 .1,σ=0 .1,k=0 .01,ρ=0 .025. The
ﬁgure shows that whenever yt hits the lower or the upper barrier the agent pays
the cost k and reduce the discrepancy to c. It should also be noticed that when
µ>(<)0, c>(<)0, since the drift in the frictionless optimal process will move
the discrepancy in the opposite direction when there is no adjustment. The upper
and the lower barriers u and l are not symmetric with respect to c either.


































u = 0.1954 
c = 0.0527 
l = -0.1379 
adjust 
k = 0.01     
σ = 0.1 
µ = 0.1    
ρ = 0.025 
As mentioned above, this kind of rule has been used to model inventories,
prices, employment, and investment. It has important features of the microeco-
nomic behavior: there is inaction, and intermittent adjustments. However, it
rests on the assumption that all the relevant information arrives continously and
is immediately known.
3.2. Infrequent but immediate information
In this subsection we assume that we observe the desired level for the control
variable x∗, but that the innovation is infrequent. Speciﬁcally, we assume that it
follows a Poisson process with constant arrival rate λ, and that, conditional on
the arrival, the innovation has zero mean and ﬁxed variance distribution. Then:
dx
∗ = µdt + σεdq
9where q is a Poisson arrival process with intensity λ,a n dε is a standard normal
random variable. When there is no control y will evolve according to the following
stochastic diﬀerential equation:
dy = −µdt + εσdq
Then, the diﬀerential form of the Bellman equation (3.1) can be written as:
−Vy(y)µ − (ρ + λ)V (y)+λE [V (y + σε)] + y
2 =0
The general solution is given by:
V (y)=Ae
β1y + Be
β2y + Vp(y) (3.12)
















One particular solution would correspond to the case of never adjusting. This















−ρτ [EVp(y − µτ + σε)]
¸
dτ
The solution to this equation can be obtained by the method of undetermined
coeﬃcients. We guess that Vp(y)=ay2 + by + e, substitute it in the equation








As before the smooth pasting and value matching conditions (3.7), (3.10),
(3.11), (3.8), and (3.9) are boundary conditions which should be satisﬁed, deter-
mining the constants A and B, and the policy parameters l, c,a n du.
10Figure 2 below shows various adjustment possibilities of the discrepancy be-
tween the control variable and its optimal level. First, a jump (denoted by a small
circle in the ﬁgure) caused by the arrival of a lump of information brings the dis-
crepancy outside the lower barrier triggering an adjustment to c. In the second
instance of the Poisson arrival of information the discrepancy process jumps but
stays within the barriers: there is no adjustment. There is also the possibility
of an uninformed adjustment if the discrepancy reaches its lower level before an
information arrival.
Instances of infrequent economic news which are known as soon as they happen
can be a ﬁnancial crash, a catastrophic event such as an earthquake, the discovery
of an oil ﬁeld, an accidental death of a company CEO, etc. Abstracting from
innovations of other types which happen on a continuous basis, we can imagine
that innovations are only of this random and lumpy type and compute the optimal
rule as just described.










k = 0.01     
σ = 0.1 
µ = 0.1    
λ = 1  
ρ = 0.025 
u = 0.2329 
c = 0.0712 
l = -0.1293 
inovation 
adjust  o 
adjust 
11Table 1 below compares the values of the barriers and of the target level for
the continuous Brownian case and two Poisson infrequent information cases with
diﬀerent intensities. To compare the continuous case to the infrequent Poisson
cases we choose λ =1in order to equalize the conditional variances of the two
discrepancy processes. The ﬁrst result is that the barriers are wider under the
infrequent information λ =1case than in the continuous case. The second result
is that, as the Poisson intensity increases, the barriers become more symmetric
around the target level. This is due to the symmetry of the Poisson process.
Indeed, given a ﬁxed µ, when λ is increased the Poisson process becomes relatively
more important.
Table 1
Values of barriers and optimal target under continuous and infrequent
immediate information
µ =0 .1,σ=0 .1,k=0 .01,ρ=0 .025
Continuous Infrequent Infrequent
λ =1 λ =5
u 0.1954 0.2329 0.2616
c 0.0527 0.0712 0.0343
l -0.1379 -0.1293 -0.2144
Although we characterized the control rule as two-sided Ss rules in both the
infrequent information case and in the standard continous information case, there
are qualitative diﬀerences between the controlled processes. With continous infor-
m a t i o n ,a d j u s t m e n t si nt h es a m ed i r e c t i o nh a v ea l w a y st h es a m es i z e ,w h i l ei nt h e
infrequent information case this rarely happens. Adjustments may be triggered
b yn e wi n f o r m a t i o no rb yt h ed e t e r m i n i s t i ct r e n d .I nt h el a t t e rc a s ew eh a v eu n i n -
formed adjustments. The possibility of generating uninformed adjustments is an
interesting feature of infrequent information models, since several decision rules
described in the literature entail this type of adjustment (e.g. Fischer, 1976).
124. Optimal rules under Delayed Information
In the previous section, all information, continuous or infrequent, was readily
available. In those cases, the optimal rules under adjustment costs were state-
dependent. In this section, there will be lapses of time during which no information
is available although we could think that some innovation is happening. Then each
information arrival will encapsulate all the innovations about the optimal value of
the control variable which occured during the last lapse. Examples are pervasive
in economic life. The release of macroeconomic statistics and some economic news
are examples of such infrequent and delayed information processes. In the former
case arrival is deterministic while in the latter it can be seen as random. We show
that in both cases the optimal rule becomes time-and-state dependent.
We start by the case of random information, which can be obtained by slightly
changing the “immediately available but infrequent information” case of the pre-
vious section. Then, we explore the case where information about the optimal
control level arrives at constant time intervals. Finally, we add more realism by
recognizing that some ﬂow of information arrives continuously between the dis-
crete information arrivals while part of the information still arrives infrequently
at constant time intervals.
All the problems with infrequent and delayed information will be solved nu-
merically using ﬁnite diﬀerence methods. Thus, for each case, we ﬁrst formulate
the problem analytically and then present an algorithm for solving the problem
numerically.
4.1. Random Information Arrival
4.1.1. Analytical formulation
We assume that x∗ follows a Brownian motion as in (3.2), but it is only observed
at a random time, which has a negative exponential distribution. Then, when
there is no control, the expected discrepancy y will have a trend −µ .I ft h e r ei s
an information arrival, there will be an innovation with zero mean and variance
13proportional to the time elapsed since the last information arrival. Formally,
when there is no control the expected discrepancy y will evolve according to the
following diﬀerential equation:
dy = −µdt + εσ
√
τdq (4.1)
where q is a Poisson arrival process with intensity λ,a n dε is a standard normal
random variable.
Notice the similarity of this case with the immediate but infrequent information
case of the previous section. However, the jumps in the state variable y have
diﬀerent sources: under immediate information, y = x − x∗ jumps whenever x∗
jumps, while under the delayed information y = x − Esx∗ jumps when a jump
occurs at s (from a given value s<tto t)d u et ot h ea r r i v a lo fi n f o r m a t i o na b o u t
x∗.
An important diﬀerence is that the time since the last information arrival τ
now matters. Although the probability of an information arrival does not depend
on τ, the amount of information at each arrival (as measured by the variance of
the accumulated innovation in x∗ during this period) is proportional to τ .T h u s ,






Therefore, the barriers will depend on τ.
We now look for rules {l(τ),c(τ),u(τ)}0≤τ<∞ where l(τ), u(τ), c(τ) represent
lower and upper trigger points and target point, respectively. Using (4.1) and
(4.2), we can write the diﬀerential form of the Bellman equation (2.5) as:
−Vy(y,τ)µ+Vt(y,τ)−(ρ+λ)V (y,τ)+λE
£







Since adjustment costs are lump-sum, adjustment will be made to the point
that minimizes intertemporal costs. Then:
14c(τ)=i n f
y {V (y,τ)} (4.4)
S i n c ei ti sa l w a y sp o s s i b l et op a yt h ea d j u s t m e n tc o s tk and to adjust to c(τ),
we have that
V (y(τ),τ)=m i n{V (y(τ),τ),V(c(τ),τ)+k} (4.5)
It is clear that if l(τ) and u(τ) are trigger points, then:
V (l(τ),τ)=V (c(τ),τ)+k (4.6)
V (u(τ),τ)=V (c(τ),τ)+k
T h et i m ev a r i a b l eτ can take any positive value. Hence, we need to ﬁnd the value
function and the trigger and target points for each positive time. We use ﬁnite
diﬀerence methods to solve the problem numerically.
4.1.2. Numerical algorithm
In order to ﬁnd the optimal rule {l(τ),c(τ),u(τ)},w en e e dt oﬁnd the value
function. We start by discretizing the partial diﬀerential equation(4.3), using the
explicit diﬀerence method. We make the following approximations:
y ≈ i 4 y (4.7)






















































Thus, if we have the value function for all states at time j+1,w ec a nu s ee q u a t i o n
(4.8) to ﬁnd the value function at time j.We start with an arbitrary value function
for τ very large and proceed backwards using the diﬀerence equation in the same
way as before until arriving at zero. If τ is large enough, the value function found
should be a good approximation for τ small. Although the initial value function
is arbitrary, if τ is large enough and if the discount rate ρ is not too big, it will
have little importance for the value function evaluated at a small τ.
4.1.3. The optimal rule
Figure 3 shows the functions l(τ),c(τ),u(τ), which characterize the optimal rule.
Since we have a negative drift in the process of y, uninformed adjustments are
always upwards. As a consequence only the lower barrier is binding at times of
no adjustment. The upper barrier is used only at time of information arrivals,
where τ =0 , and remains constant. The lower bound function, l(τ),i ss l i g h t l y
decreasing. The reason is that the option value of waiting for an information
arrival increases with τ due to a higher amount of innovations missed. We also
depicts a sample trajectory for y, where we show two information arrivals. In the
ﬁrst one, y jumps to a point below the lower barrier triggering adjustment to c.
In the second information arrival, y jumps upwards to a point inside the inaction
range. Thus, there is no adjustment. Observe also in the ﬁgure that everytime
there is an information arrival τ is reset to zero.
T h eg e n e r a lf e a t u r e so ft h i sc a s ea r et h a tt h er u l e sa r ec h a r a c t e r i z e db yt r i g g e r
and target functions of the time elapsed since the last information arrival. When
16there is no information, adjustment is only triggered by the trend and it moves
the control variable in the same direction as the drift of the frictionless variable.
Therefore, only the lower barrier (for a positive trend) or the upper barrier (for
a negative trend) can be binding. The lower barrier (upper barrier) decreases
(increases) with τ. Therefore, in the case of a positive drift, we have a decreasing
lower barrier function and a decreasing target function for τ greater then zero.
When information is revealed τ becomes zero and y m a yj u m pi na n yd i r e c t i o n .
Then, when τ is zero we have both an upper and a lower barrier. As a result,
as in the case before, we can have uninformed adjustments between information
arrivals and informed or “optimal” adjustments triggered by information arrivals.
It is also possible that an information arrival will not trigger any adjustment.
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174.2. Deterministic Information Arrival
4.2.1. Analytical formulation
As mentioned before, one important source of infrequent and delayed information
is the release of economic statistics. This is done usually at regular intervals of
times. How is the problem changed if now information arrives deterministically
at regular intervals of time T?
TWhen no control is exerted, and there is no information arrival (for 0 <
τ<T ), the expected discrepancy y will have a deterministic trend µ and no
innovation. Then, it will evolve according to the following diﬀerential equation:
dy = −µdt
The ﬂow cost, f(y,τ) will still be given by (4.2). As a consequence, we can
rewrite equation (2.5) as the following diﬀerential equation:
−Vy(y,τ)µ + Vt(y,τ) − ρV (y,τ)+y
2 + σ
2τ =0 (4.9)
Again we look for rules {l(τ),c(τ),u(τ)}0≤τ≤T.B u t o b s e r v e t h a t n o w τ is
bounded by T.
Since adjustment costs are lump-sum, we know that adjustment will be made
to the point that minimizes intertemporal costs. Conditions (4.4), (4.5), and (4.6)
are still valid.
However since information arrives deterministically, we need to tie the value
function just before the arrival to the value fuction after the arrival. When in-
formation arrives, the known discrepancy will receive a shock with distribution
N(0,σ 2T),a n dτ is reset to zero. Then we have the following additional condition:
V (y,T)=EV(y + σ
√
Tε,0) (4.10)
where ε is a random variable with distribution N(0,1).
184.2.2. Numerical algorithm
In order to ﬁnd the optimal rule {l(τ),c(τ),u(τ)},w en e e dt oﬁnd the value
function. We start by discretizing the partial diﬀerential equation (4.9) using the








































T h u s ,i fw eh a v et h ev a l u ef u n c t i o nf o ra l ls t a t e sa tt i m ej+1,w ec a nu s ee q u a -
tion (4.11) to ﬁnd the value function at time j. We use the following algorithm.
We guess values for the function at time zero. It is important that it satisﬁes
condition (4.5). We then use the expectation equation (4.10) to ﬁnd the value
function at time T.W e ﬁnd the y that minimizes the function at T, c(T).W e
then use condition (4.5) to determine the new value at T.W eu s et h ed i ﬀerence
equation (4.11) to ﬁnd the value function at time T −4t.W et h e nﬁnd the value
of y that minimizes the function at T −4t, and so on, until we arrive at time zero.
We then test if the value function just found at zero is close enough (according
to some convergence criterion set a prioiri) to the value we had at the previous
iteration before. If the value functions are diﬀerent we begin another iteration of
the same procedure, continuing in the same way until convergence.
After convergence we use conditions (4.4), and (4.6) for each τ to ﬁnd c(τ),
u(τ),a n dl(τ).
194.2.3. The Optimal Rule
Figure 4 illustrates the optimal rule, characterized by the lower barrier function
l(τ), target function c(τ), and upper barrier parameter u. Observe that, again in
this case, when there is no information ﬂow to the agent, there are only upward
adjustments. The upper barrier will be used only at times of information arrival.
We illustrate a sample path for y. Initiallyy is close to zero, and arrives at time
1 inside the inaction region, but outside the inaction region for τ =0 . Then, the
accumulated shock is revealed and y jumps to the position marked with o, outside
the new inaction range. An immediate adjustment is triggered to c(0). Then,
with no information, y decreases at a constant rate from c(0),a n ds oo n .
Although in both random and deterministic information arrival cases the rules
are similar, there is a distinguishing feature. In the deterministic case the inaction
r a n g eb e c o m e sa r b i t r a r i l yl a r g ej u s tb e f o r ei n f o r m a t i o na r r i v a l . T h er e a s o ni s
clear: the option value of waiting becomes very large when information is about
to arrive. This is a testable implication. One should see less adjustments just
before important announcements.
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4.3. Part of information continuously observed
4.3.1. Analytical formulation
In fact there is almost a continuous ﬂow of some information, although some
important information arrives infrequently. We intend to capture this fact by
extending the previous model in the following way. We assume that there are two
kinds of information, one called idiosyncratic, which is continuously observed, and
another one, called aggregate, which arrives at deterministic times.
In this case, when there is no adjustment and no aggregate information ar-
rival, y changes continuously because of the idiosyncratic information, which has
21standard deviation parameter σi:
dy = −µdt + σidwi.
Aggregate information impacts also the expected costs of deviating from the






where σa is the standard deviation of aggregate shocks. Hence, the diﬀerential










The conditions that determine c (4.4), the adjustment option condition (4.5),
and the conditions that determine l and u (4.6) remain the same. However, the
condition that ties the value function at time 1 and at time 0 is altered:
V (y,T)=EV(y + σa
√
Tε,0).
We apply the numerical procedures described in the previous subsection to the
modiﬁed equations.
4.3.2. Numerical algorithm
Discretizing the partial diﬀerential equation using the explicit diﬀerence method,































































We use the same algorithm as in the section above to arrive at the solution.
4.3.3. The optimal rule
Figure 5 shows the rules and one sample path for y.F o r τ between zero and
one, it oscillates according to the idiosyncratic stochastic component. When it
r e a c h e st h el o w e rb a r r i e r ,a d j u s t m e n ti st r i g g e r e dt oc(.) of the respective τ.T h e s e
adjustments take into consideration only part of the relevant information. When
τ reaches 1 aggregate information arrives and y jumps. If it is outside the inaction
range at zero, an adjustment is triggered to c(0).
A feature of this setting is that no totally uniformed adjustment occurs. The
agent uses the information readily available for adjustment if she evaluates that
the discrepancy is large enough. If our control variable is individual price or
wage, and if the continuous information is the price level we have a rule that
generates adjustments by the price level between fully informed or “optimal ”
adjustments. In fact these price adjustments are state-dependent rather than
time-dependent, being more similar to trigger clauses in wage contracts. Despite
the continuous ﬂow of information, the inaction range becomes again very large
before the deterministic time of information arrival. Thus, the implication that
one should not see adjustments before an important information announcement
is not speciﬁc to that special setting.
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245. Conclusion
In this paper we explore the consequences of infrequent information for decision
making when there are adjustment costs. The rule followed by the agents are
more complex than the usual state-dependent rules. In general, the inaction
ranges depend on the time elapsed since the last information arrival.
There is room for uninformed adjustments when there is no new information
arriving but the trend of the control variables must be large enough. When
some important variable for the optimal control variable is observed, there can be
adjustments based on its realization even when important information about the
optimal level of the control variable has not been released. A robust fact is that
there should be no adjustments just before the release of important information
about the optimal level of the control variable.
We hope that the paper will stimulate applications in areas where microeco-
nomic inaction seem realistic: pricing, investment, inventories, and employment.
One natural extension to be made entails assuming that information is costly,
and the information cost is separated from the adjustment costs5. The same state
variables deﬁned in this paper could be used, and the optimal rule should still be
time-and-state dependent.
5When both adjustment cost and information costs cannot be separated the optimal rule is
to set a ﬁx level for the control variable for a predetermined amount of time. The rule is then
time-dependent. See Bonomo and Carvalho (2003) for an application to nominal price rigidity.
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